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Kaplan: All the King's Horses and All the King's Men: The Failing Company

NOTES AND COMMENTS
ALL THE KING'S HORSES AND ALL THE KING'S
MEN: THE FAILING COMPANY DOCTRINE AS A
CONDITIONAL DEFENSE TO SECTION 7 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT
According to a judicially created doctrine,I a failing company
may be acquired or merged with another company without risk
of liability under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 2 With qualifications not here relevant, section 7, as amended in 1950,1 prohibits
a corporation engaged in commerce from acquiring the whole or
any part of the stock or assets of another corporation also engaged
in commerce, "where in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly."4
The broad purpose of the amended section is to prevent
mergers or acquisitions which may reduce significantly the level
of competition in an industry. The statute outlaws threats to
competition in their incipiency, before they reach proportions
which would justify proceedings under the Sherman Act. The
threat to competition has been determined, for the most part, by
a consideration of the individual and resulting market shares of
the merged firms.5 To set the resulting market share in its proper
perspective courts have considered criteria such as the market
1. See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930), discussed in notes 86-96
infra and accompanying text. InternationalShoe is generally considered the seminal case
on the doctrine. But see notes 97-115 infra and accompanying text.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1974), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The Act provides
in part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
3. Celler-Kefauver Amendments, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), amending ch. 323, §
7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1974)).
4. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1974) (see note 2 supra). See also United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES

(1968), 1 TRADE

REG.

REP.

4510 (1968).

5. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
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shares of other companies in the relevant market, the degree of
concentration in the market, and any trends toward further concentration or towards deconcentrationA
Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that the scope of
a section 7 suit should be widened to consider nonstatistical evidence which negates the Government's statistical prima facie
case of substantially lessened competition.7 The trial of section 7
suits had increasingly become a manipulation of production and
sales statistics disregarding nonstatistical criteria that may also
have had an effect on the level of competition in an industry.8 The
recent shift in the Court's approach is based on a recognition that
some mergers may not be undesirable even though market statistics indicate otherwise. The purpose of this article is to examine
the vitality of the failing company doctrine in light of this and
other recent developments. A question which will be discussed is
whether the doctrine's requirements, and the underlying
rationales upon which they are premised, accurately distinguish
between desirable and undesirable acquisitions or mergers involving companies suffering severe financial difficulties. An answer
will be sought through an examination of the origins of the doctrine, the legislative comment on it, the policies underlying it,
and its economic justification.
The failing company doctrine affords the only "defense" to
section 7-other than the investment company defense specified
in the statute'-that the courts"0 and Congress" have specifically
recognized. The 1950 Amendment significantly increased the
6. Id.
7. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974), discussed in
notes 68-81 infra and accompanying text; see United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
422 U.S. 86, 112, 119 (1975); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602,
637-39, 641 (1974). See also note 159 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 .(1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); cf.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), 1 TRADE REG. REP. 4510 (1968).
9. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1974), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
The Act provides in pertinent part:
This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in
attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition.
10. See cases cited at note 27 infra.
11. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949). For a discussion of the congressional view of the "failing
company" doctrine see notes 131-49 infra and accompanying text.
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effectiveness of section 7 in preventing undesirable concentrations of industrial power, 2 and consequently increased the importance of the failing company doctrine. Briefly stated, the doctrine allows an acquiring firm, or an acquired or soon to be acquired firm, to interpose the financial difficulties and near bankruptcy of the acquired or soon to be acquired firm as a defense to
a section 7 prosecution. As the doctrine developed, two independent rationales were given for it: (1) that any merger with or
acquisition of a company which will shortly leave the market due
to its failing condition cannot generate anticompetitive effects; 3
and (2) that courts should protect the stockholders, creditors, and
others whose financial interests are tied to a failing concern by
allowing the merger or acquisition. 4 It is submitted that the first
rationale is economically unsound, and therefore can no' longer
justify the doctrine, and that the latter is insufficient to be dispositive in all cases.
The doctrine has been viewed as either a per se affirmative
defense which relieves the parties of all liability under section 7
whenever its strict requirements are satisfied, notwithstanding
the substantiality of the competitive injury that is threatened,
or, not as an affirmative defense at all, but one of several considerations which might negate an implication of substantially
lessened competition arising from the Government's statistical
prima facie case. Under the per se approach, if the requirements
of the doctrine are satisfied, the merger or acquisition is permitted irrespective of serious threats to the competitive process.
When the doctrine is viewed as bearing directly on the Government's case, the merger or acquisition is invalidated regardless
of the seriousness of a company's financial difficulties, if a substantial anticompetitive effect can be shown. The result has
been to allow mergers or acquisitions which are undesirable and
to invalidate mergers or acquisitions which are desirable. At the
expense of clarity, some courts faced with this dilemma have
12. See Dooley, FailingCompany Doctrine:Recent Developments, 47 TEXAS L. REv.
1437, 1439 (1969); Hale & Hale, FailingFirms and the Merger Provisionsof the Antitrust
Laws, 52 Ky. L.J. 597 (1964); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the
Celler-KefauverAntimergerAct,61 COLuM. L. REv. 629, 629-31 (1961); Comment, Federal
Antitrust Law-Mergers-An Updating of the "Failing Company" Doctrine in the
Amended Section 7 Setting, 61 MicH. L. REv. 566 (1963).
13. See notes 116-30 infra and accompanying text. Some such acquisitions or mergers
may, in fact, generate procompetitive effects by keeping a component of the market alive
as a competitive influence thereby avoiding undesirable concentration. See notes 100-08
infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 116-30 infra and accompanying text.
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manipulated the strict requirements of the doctrine to achieve
an acceptable result. This article posits that neither approach
accomplishes the objectives of the doctrine. A third approach is
proposed which considers the anticompetitive effect of a merger
or acquisition in relation to the severity of a company's financial
difficulties. This would accurately identify those mergers with,
or acquisitions of, failing companies which are desirable in light
of a supportable rationale for the doctrine.
In an attempt to narrow the failing company doctrine the
Supreme Court has created strict requirements which must be
fulfilled in order to claim the benefits of the doctrine."' These
strict requirements ignore circumstances which are relevant to a
principled application of the doctrine. By proposing an alternate
approach to failing company questions this article advocates a
broadening of the inquiry involved. Those requirements which
continue to have a logical relationship to a supportable rationale
should continue to be important in the overall determination, but
should not be dispositive in all cases. This approach is consistent
with the recent trend to consider all the circumstances of a
merger or acquisition in section 7 prosecutions on a case-by-case
basis, relying less on rigid formulae such as a narrow statistical
analysis.
THE PRESENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE
The failing company doctrine may be established although
the acquired company is not actually in receivership at the time
of the merger or acquisition. The troublesome question in this
regard is just how close to receivership or bankruptcy the acquired firm must be in order to successfully invoke the defense.
Here, the cases are inconsistent and often confusing in their attempts to define and apply the proper criteria. Courts have re15. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); United States
v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962), rev'g and remanding 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio
1961); cf. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERCER GUIDELINES § 9 (1968), 1 TRADE REG. REP. %4510,
at 6881-89 (1968), which states:
A merger which the Department would otherwise challenge will ordinarily not
be challenged if (i) the resources of one of the merging firms are so depleted and
its prospects for rehabilitation so remote that the firm faces the clear probability
of a business failure, and (ii) good faith efforts by the failing firm have failed to
elicit a reasonable offer of acquisition more consistent with the purposes of
Section 7 by a firm which intends to keep the failing firm in the market.
See also United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971).
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quired that the concern be "fac[ing] the grave probability of
business failure";' 6 "continuing ... at a loss";'7 "nearly worthless";' 8 "in a competitive sense, dead . . . .[or] a shell rapidly
falling into decay";' 9 "closing out its business because of financial
difficulties"; 20 "hopelessly insolvent"; 2 "deeply in debt"; 22 "in a
failing or near bankrupt condition";2 3 "[not a] viable company-overall"; 24 "irretrievably failing without possibility of recovery";25 and "in such straits that the termination of the enterprise and the dispersal of its assets seems inevitable unless a rival
proprietor shall acquire and continue the business."2
Generally, the defense has been difficult to establish and
courts have not looked favorably upon it.Y In 1969, the Supreme
16. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930); In re Pillsbury Co., 57
F.T.C. 1274, 1409 (1960), vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.
1966).
17. American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 F. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1917).
18. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 446 (1920).
19. Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 299 F. 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1924).
20. Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743
(1944).
21. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902, 906 (S.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd on
other grounds, 369 U.S. 654 (1962); United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C. 1958), aft'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); see In re Farm
Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 31 (1956) ("faced with actual or imminent insolvency").
22. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799,
808 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
23. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 831 (9th Cir. 1961); see United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902, 906 (S.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd on other grounds,
369 U.S. 654 (1962) ("faced with imminent receivership"); United States v. Maryland &
Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458
(1960) ("in fact on the brink of bankruptcy").
24. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 1973),
aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906, rehearingdenied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974).
25. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 98 (D. Colo. 1975); see United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
26. Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 1961).
27. Acquisitions or mergers were successfully justified on failing company grounds in:
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930); Unitead States v. United States
Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 446 (1920) (a Sherman Act stock acquisition case); Granader
v. Public Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 84 (6th Cir. 1969); Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944); Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 299 F.
361, 365 (3d Cir. 1924); American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 F. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1917)
(a Sherman Act assets acquisition case); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78,
102 (D. Colo. 1975); United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F.
Supp. 799, 808-09 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); In re Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1191 (1968).
Failing company defenses were rejected in the following cases: United States v.
Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1971); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1969); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,
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Court decided Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States28 in which
it narrowed the defense by requiring an additional showing that
there be no other "available purchaser" whose acquisition of, or
merger with, the failing company would have a lesser anticompetitive effect.29 This requirement, which concentrates on the com277-78 (1966); United States v. El Paso Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 n.46 (1963); United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
369 U.S. 654 (1962), rev'g and remanding 197 F. Supp. 902 (D.C. Ohio 1961); Golden
Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1972); United States Steel Corp.
v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 605-09 (6th Cir. 1970); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d
800, 831 (9th Cir. 1961); Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 1961);
Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,309, at 66,221 (S.D.
Tex. April 25, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-27-79 (5th Cir. July 7, 1975); United States
v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 74,873, at 95,874 (M.D. Pa.);
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd
mem., 418 U.S. 906, rehearingdenied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen
of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Automated Bldg. Components, Inc.
v. Trueline Truss Co., 318 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Ore. 1970); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 1003 (E.D. Wis. 1969); United States v. Reed Roller Bit
Co., 274 F. Supp. 573, 584 (W.D. Okla. 1967); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 260 F.
Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), rev'd and remanded on othergrounds, 390 U.S. 171 (1968);
United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 252 F. Supp. 129, 144 (N.D. Cal. 1966); United
States v. Penzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 979 (W.D. Pa. 1965); In re Pillsbury Co., 57 F.T.C.
1274, 1410 (1960), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966);
In re Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 31 (1956).
28. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
29. Id. at 138. The Court explained that:
The failing company doctrine plainly cannot be applied . . . unless it is
established that the company that acquires the failing company. . . is the only
available purchaser. For if another person or group could be interested, a unit
in the competitive system would be preserved and not lost to monopoly power.
Id.; accord, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974)(dictum);
United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1971).
The requirement that there be "no other available purchaser" had its origins in
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930), where the Court simply noted
that there was "no other prospective purchaser." The requirement was first litigated,
however, in United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962), rev'g and remanding197
F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961). In Diebold the district court granted summary judgment
for the defendant because the acquired company had become "hopelessly insolvent and
faced with imminent receivership [for nine months]." 197 F. Supp. 902, 906 (S.D. Ohio
1961). In reversing, the Supreme Court observed:
In determining that the acquisition . . . was not a violation of § 7, the
District Court acted upon its findings that "[the defendant] was the only bona
fide prospective purchaser. . . ." [This] finding represents at least in part the
resolution of a head-on factual controversy as revealed by the materials before
the District Court of whether other offers . . . were actually made.
369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962), quoting 197 F. Supp. 902, 907 (S.D. Ohio 1961). The requirement
voiced in Diebold that there be no other bona fide prospective purchaser was made explicit
in Citizen Publishingwhere the Court required a specific evidentiary showing that there
were unsuccessful efforts to sell to other purchasers. See Dooley, supra note 12. The Court
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petitive effect of an acquisition or merger and directs the inquiry
away from the acquired concern's financial difficulties, is now an
accepted element of the defense. There must be some showing of
an attempt to sell to another party: that other parties were "approached,"30 that the properties were "put in the hands of a broker, ' 31 or that there was at least an invitation for bids from other
parties or an attempt to obtain other funding. 2 The requirement
can be viewed as one of proof that no other less anticompetitive
acquisition was possible and that the acquired and acquiring
firms proceeded in good faith. 3 By focusing some attention on the
competitive aspects of the acquisition, the requirement has substantially weakened the conceptual basis of the failing company
doctrine as a per se affirmative defense.34
Citizen Publishingappeared to add another limitation on the
in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1968), stated:
[Nbo effort was made to sell the Citizen; its properties and franchise were not
put in the hands of a broker; and the record is silent on what the market, if any,
for the Citizen might have been.
The dissent in Citizen Publishingwas critical of this narrow evidentiary requirement:
[PIroof of unsuccessful efforts to sell the company is not, as a logical, evidentiary matter, the only possible conclusive proof that it was not marketable. In
many cases other evidence might make equally clear that any such efforts would
surely have been fruitless.
Id. at 143 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also M. HANDLER, TVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
ANTITRUST 469, 471 (1973). Handler is critical of the requirement on the grounds that (1)
there is little significance to whether other purchasers may be interested if the selling
company is truly failing; and (2) there are serious practical difficulties in forcing the
selling company to make the required investigations of other purchasers when bankruptcy
is imminent.
30. United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 556 (1971); see Golden
Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1972), where the court stated:
[The defendant] did prove that other companies looked at, but decided not to
buy, [the failing company], but [the defendant] did not prove that the owners
of [the failing company] had made any affirmative attempt to seek out other
purchasers. Merely proving that some or all of the most logical purchasers have
declined to buy is not enough to prove that the challenged purchaser was the
only prospective purchaser. [Citation omitted.]
31. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969); Calnetics Corp.
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
32. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 101-02 (D. Colo. 1975).
33. See Dooley, supra note 12.
34. Id. Dooley views the requirement as being
clearly inconsistent with the traditional per se defense view of the doctrine
... . Although the Court in taking this position apparently indicated a strong
bias for preserving competition, it failed to abolish entirely the per se defense
concept; instead, the Court merely modified the concept by requiring proof of
the lack of alternative purchasers before it becomes applicable.
Id. at 1445.
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failing company doctrine. Justice Douglas, writing for the major-

ity, indicated that the defense may not be established unless the
defendant proves that the acquired company could
not continue
35
to operate under receivership or reorganization:
[T]he prospects of reorganization [under Chapter X or XI of
the Bankruptcy Act] of Citizen in 1940 would have had to be
dim or nonexistent to make the failing company doctrine applicable to this case.

This requirement has been specifically followed and applied in
3
two lower court cases 36 and specifically rejected in another. 1
Other cases have simply ignored it.3 s The possible existence of a
3
"third requirement" "-that
prospects of reorganization of an
acquired company must be "dim or nonexistent" before the defense can be invoked-raises serious questions concerning the
underlying rationale of the defense and its future application.
This article will examine those questions. The imposition of the
"third requirement," as a necessary element, will be shown to be
35. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969). Citizen
Publishing involved the purchase of stock of one of the two daily newspapers of general
circulation in Tucson, Arizona, by the shareholders of the other pursuant to an option in
a 1940 joint operating agreement. Id. at 133-35. The district court found that the stock
acquisition violated section 7 in that it had the proscribed effect of continuing in a more
permanent manner the substantial lessening of competition that the joint operating agreement had established. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 984 (D.
Ariz. 1968). The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting a failing company defense because
there was no evidence "that the joint operating agreement was the last straw," Citizen
Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137 (1969), or "[that the acquiring company was] the only available purchaser." Id. at 138.
36. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1970), final order
1972 TRADE REG. REP. 20,139 (F.T.C. 1972); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.,
1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,309 (S.D. Tex. April 25,1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-27-79 (5th
Cir. July 7, 1975). Other cases have merely cited the language in Citizen Publishing
without giving any special significance to it other than as a general indication of how
narrow the defense should be. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F.
Supp. 1226, 1259 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906, rehearing denied, 419 U.S.
886 (1974). For a discussion of Heatransferand PhillipsPetroleum see note 46 infra.
37. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 96 (D. Colo. 1975).
38. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974);
United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1971); Golden Grain
Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1972); Granader v. Public Bank, 417
F.2d 75,81 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 Trade
Cas. T74,873, at 95,874 (M.D. Pa.); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348
F. Supp. 606, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1972); In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1191
(1968) (Elman & Jones, Comm'rs, dissenting).
39. "Dim or nonexistent prospects for reorganization" will be referred to as a third
requirement for purposes of analysis, although the requirement could be considered simply a stricter test of business failure (the first requirement).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss3/3

8

Kaplan: All the King's Horses and All the King's Men: The Failing Company

Failing Company Doctrine
an aberration; "dim or nonexistent" prospects for reorganization
are, at most, of limited relevance to the failing company doctrine.
CASES SUBSEQUENT TO CITIZEN PUBLISHING

United States Steel Corp. v. FTC" set forth the argument
that Citizen Publishing established a third element essential to
proof of the failing company defense. This Sixth Circuit case
involved the forward vertical acquisition of the largest nonintegrated customer of portland cement in the New York metropolitan area by the area's largest nonintegrated supplier. The defendant supplier claimed that it was completely immunized by the
failing company doctrine. The defendant established (1) that the
acquired company was in imminent danger of bankruptcy; and
(2) that the defendant was the only available purchaser. The
court found this showing insufficient to establish the failing company defense. Relying on Citizen Publishing, it held that the
defense required a showing that prospects for reorganization of
the acquired firm were "dim or nonexistent,"" and explained:42
This third requirement may be read as unnecessary to the
Court's disposition of [Citizen Publishing]. It was, however,
clearly intended by the Court to clarify the confines of the "present narrow scope" of the failing company doctrine.

The Sixth Circuit's decision was based on its finding that the
requirement "was implicit in the holding of International Shoe
[v. FTC],"4 3 the leading case on the defense," and that Citizen
Publishinghad "clarified this inference." 45 United States Steel is
the only court of appeals case, thus far, to impose the third requirement on the defense."
40. 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970).
41. Id. at 608. The case was thereafter remanded to the Federal Trade Commission
which found a violation of section 7. In re United States Steel Corp., 81 F.T.C. 652 (1972).
42. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 608 n.38 (6th Cir. 1970).
43. Id. at 608, explaining International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). For a
discussion of InternationalShoe see notes 86-96 infra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 78-88 infra and accompanying text.
45. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 609 (6th Cir. 1970).
46. The requirement was also imposed in Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.,
1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,309 (S.D. Tex. April 25, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-27-79, (5th
Cir. July 7, 1975). The jury was instructed that: "You may not find that [the acquired
company] faced the grave probability of a business failure unless you find that the
prospects of saving the company throughre-organizationin bankruptcy were dim or nonexistent." Record at 6503 (emphasis added). The case presented a vertical merger where
it was conceded that the acquired company was about to default on $1.3 million in
outstanding bank notes. The disputed merger took place after two alternate purchasers
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In United States v. M.P.M., Inc.,47 the Colorado district
court held that:48
a § 7 defendant need not be required to show that reorganization
prospects under the Bankruptcy Act were dim or nonexistent in
order to discharge its burden as to the "failing company" defense.
The case involved M.P.M.'s acquisition of two formerly independent ready-mix concrete firms which were subsequently merged.
The evidence left no doubt that one of the acquired companies
was underfinanced and that its bankruptcy was imminent. 9
There was no indication in the record, however, that the company's financial difficulties could not be cured by a
recapitalization or a suspension of its debt service.50
The case was decided on two apparently independent
grounds. The court first determined that the merger "carrie[d]
with it no threat of substantial[ly] lessen[ed] . . . competition
in the ready-mix concrete market, nor [did] it tend to create a
monopoly in the market."" The court then made a separate de52
termination that:
Mobile was a "failing company." The officers of Mobile conreneged. The court nevertheless held that the defendants "failed to meet the high threshold requirements for a failing company defense ....
[The acquired company] could
have been saved .

. . ."

Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 1975-1 Trade Cas.

60,309, at 66,221 (S.D. Tex. April 25, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-27-79 (5th Cir. July
7, 1975). The plaintiff was in the unhappy position of basing its damages on the allegation
that the acquired company would have disappeared from the market if not for the acquisition which saved it. But for the acquisition, plaintiff would have acceded to a pro rata
share, based on preacquisition market statistics, of the acquired company's business. The
plaintiff maintained that the assumption of the acquired company's continuing decline
did not conflict with the jury's determination 'that the failing company defense was not
established by the defendants. It was plaintiff's position that although the acquired company would not have been saved, from a purely hypothetical standpoint it could have been
saved through reorganization. Id. at 66,221.
There is dicta in United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1259
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd without opinion, 418 U.S. 906, rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 886
(1974), indicating that the "third requirement" language of Citizen Publishingis important as an indication of how rigid the test for the defense is. The case was decided on the
basis that the acquired firm was a "viable competitor-overall" since it had a net income
of $192 million for the five years prior to the acquisition. Id. at 1260.
47. 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975).
48. Id. at 96.
49. Id. at 100-01.
50. Id. at 96.
51. Id. at 94-95.
52. Id. at 102-03.
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ducted an earnest, wide-ranging, and good faith effort to locate
potential investors or purchasers in order to maintain Mobile as
a going concern. . .. Thus, we must find that. ..[M.P.M.]
was the only prospective purchaser. When the finding is coupled
with our conclusion that Mobile faced the grave probability of
business failure, we must hold that the defendants in this case
have fully satisfied the elements of the "failing company" defense.
The Colorado court would restrict the third requirement in
Citizen Publishing to the circumstances of that case. 3 Noting
that the defendant in Citizen Publishing did not offer any evidence to demonstrate that it was the only prospective purchaser, 54
the court reasoned that rather than prescribing a new element of
the defense, Citizen Publishing"suggest[s] an alternative to the
second prong (no other prospective purchaser) of the two-pronged
test set forth in International Shoe"5 and made explicit in
Citizen Publishing itself. The essence of the M.P.M., Inc. argument is that even if it cannot be shown-by the type of evidence
deemed necessary in Citizen Publishing and subsequent
cases 5 -that there was no other available or prospective purchaser, the defense nevertheless can be established by a showing
that the prospects for reorganization of the acquired company
were "dim or nonexistent." It was viewed as simply another way
to establish the defense. The court failed to explain the possible
relationship between an alternate available purchaser and
whether a company could successfully pass through bankruptcy.
Arguably, a company facing imminent bankruptcy, with a rapidly approaching debt service, would not have the time to engage
a broker or invite bids from prospective purchasers. A showing
that chances for a successful reorganization were "dim or nonexistent" would indicate that had the time been available a solicitation of bids would have been unsuccessful because the company
lacked any going concern value. Unfortunately, there is little in
Citizen Publishingto lead one to the conclusion that that is what
the majority had in mind.57 Citizen Publishingrequired the fact
53. Id. at 96-97.
54. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969) ("[Ihe
record is silent on what the market, if any, for the Citizen might have been.").
55. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 97 (D. Colo.1975); cf. E. KITNER,
PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 96-97 (1973); Annot., 11 A.L.R. FED. 858, 872 (1972).
56. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
57. It is noteworthy in this regard that Citizen Publishihgrequired dim or nonexistent
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of "no other available purchaser" to be established by direct evidence-that other prospective purchasers were unsuccessfully
"approached" or that the company was "put in the hands of a
broker."58 To allow indirect proof that there was "no other available purchaser" would circumvent that evidentiary requirement
which was clearly announced in the case. In fact, the majority
opinion in Citizen Publishing was criticized by the dissenting
opinion of Justice Stewart for the very reason that its approach
does not allow for alternate methods of proof.-9
The district court in M.P.M., Inc. also stressed the fact that
more recent Supreme Court cases "omit any reference to this
['dim reorganization prospects'] element."6 These cases may
indicate by way of omission that "dim or nonexistent" prospects
for reorganization is not part of the failing company defense.
In United States v. GreaterBuffalo Press,Inc.,61 decided two
years after Citizen Publishing, the Court held that the defense
had not been established.
Writing for a unanimous court, Mr.
62
Justice Douglas stated:

The test is met only if two requirements are satisfied: (1) That
the resources.

. .

were "so depleted and the prospect of rehabil-

itation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business
failure

. .

." [citing InternationalShoe] and (2) that there was

no other prospective purchaser for it [citing Citizen
Publishing].
The company's profits had actually increased in the year of the
acquisition; its expansion plans had been actively pursued and it
was paying dividends to its owners. 3 In addition, although the
acquiring firm's major competitor had declined to purchase the
company, no other smaller competitor had ever been approached. 4 Therefore, the defendant failed to meet either of the
two requirements. Because the company was not facing bankruptcy, the case could be considered to have been decided on the
prospects for reorganization "to make the failing company doctrine applicable to this
case." Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969) (emphasis added).

58. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
59. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 143 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See also note 29 supra.

60. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 97 (D. Colo. 1975).
61. 402 U.S. 549 (1971).

62. Id. at 555.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 556.
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basis of the first requirement alone." As a result, the Court had
no occasion to consider the likelihood of a reorganization if bankruptcy were to ensue. Thus, although the Court cited Citizen
Publishing for the second requirement of no other available purchaser 6 and made no reference to any alternative method of proof
or to a separate requirement that prospects for reorganization be
"dim or nonexistent," the omission adds little to the argument
either way. 7
The most recent Supreme Court case to refer to the failing
company doctrine is United States v. General Dynamics Corp."
In dictum, the Court restated the requirements for the defense.69
Citing InternationalShoe, Citizen Publishing, and GreaterBuffalo Press, the Court again made no mention of the third element
of "dim or nonexistent" prospects for reorganization, but merely
restated the two-pronged test" as had the Court in GreaterBuffalo Press.7' The case is, however, of importance to the failing
company doctrine because of its significant departure from the
previous approach to section 7 suits.
GeneralDynamics involved the horizontal merger of two coal
producers, each of whom enjoyed a substantial share of a concentrated market. The Government's case revealed that a small
number of leading producers accounted for the bulk of the coal
business and that there had been a trend toward concentration
in the industry. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
conceded that the statistical showing established a prima facie
case of illegality, 72 but found that "other pertinent factors affect65. Id. at 555-56.
66. Id. at 555.
67. Cf. Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,309, at
66,221 (S.D. Tex. April 25, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-27-79 (5th Cir. July 7, 1975);
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1259 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd
mem., 418 U.S. 906, rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974). These cases, decided after
Greater Buffalo Press, gave weight to the "third requirement." See note 46 supra.
68. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). For a more complete discussion of General Dynamics see
Knapp, General Dynamics, Mirage or Oasis?, 26 MERCER L. REV. 577 (1975); Moyer,
United States v. GeneralDynamics Corp.:An Interpretation,20 ANTrrRUsT BULL. 1 (1975);
Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243 (1975); Williams,
Corporate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 26 MERCER L. REV. 963 (1975); Comment,
Competition, Competitors, and the PoliticalLimits of the Supreme Court's Clayton § 7
Policy, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 693 (1975); 24 DRA L. REv. 223 (1974); 53 N.C.L. REv. 535
(1975); 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 281 (1974); 27 VAND. L. REV. 1279 (1974).
69. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974).
70. Id.
71. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
72. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 496-98, 508 (1974).
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ing the coal industry and the business of appellees mandated a
conclusion that no substantial lessening of competition occurred
or was threatened by the acquisition . . . . " The acquired coal
company's reserves were tied up under long-term requirements
contracts so that although the company was financially healthy
its available reserves were low and it was not in a position to
increase them. 74 As a result the Court determined that the acquired company could not compete effectively for the long-term
contracts 75 which were the prevalent means of competition in the
industry. Thus, the company was a far less significant factor in
the coal producing market than the production statistics indicated. 6
The Government argued that reliance on the fact of depleted
and committed resources was essentially the assertion of a failing
company defense which, under the circumstances, did not meet
the defense's strict requirements. The majority rebuffed this con77
tention:
The appellees' demonstration of United's weak reserves position, however, proved an entirely different point. . . . [T]he
finding of inadequate reserves went to the heart of the Government's statistical prima facie case . . . . The failing-company
defense is simply inappropriate to this finding and the failure
of appellees to meet the prerequisites of that doctrine did not
detract from the validity of the court's analysis.
Justice Stewart seized this opportunity to comment on the ill78
defined doctrine:
73. Id. at 498.
74. Id. at 502-03.
75, Id. at 508.
76. Id. at 503. The case is the first to take advantage of the rebuttable presumption
expressed in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963):
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the
relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially
that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the
merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.
Id. at 363 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan significantly expanded the formulation in
a footnote. "[I]f concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight
increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration
is correspondingly great." Id. at 365 n.42; accord, United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271,
279 (1964).
77. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 508 (1974).
78. Id. at 507, quoting International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930). It is
interesting to note that Justice Stewart's "balancing" test would involve the Court in a
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The failing-company defense presupposes that the effect on
competition and the "loss to [the company's] stockholders and
injury to the communities where its plants were operated,"
[citation omitted], will be less if a company continues to exist
even as a party to a merger than if it disappears entirely from
the market. It is, in a sense, a "lesser of two evils" approach, in
which the possible threat to competition resulting from an acquisition is deemed preferable to the adverse impact on competition and other losses if the company goes out of business.

General Dynamics appears to be broader than its facts. The
Court may be more willing in the future to go beyond the statistical case presented by the Government and consider the future
competitive posture of the acquired company in relation to the
industry's structure in order to determine effects on competition. 9 By distinguishing that inquiry from a failing company situation, the Court may have made the strict requirements of the
failing company doctrine irrelevant." At least one commentator"
has suggested that the strict requirements of the defense may
never be reached under the approach taken in GeneralDynamics
since a violation under section 7 could not be established when
the acquired firm is in a failing condition and would therefore
have an insubstantial effect on future competition. The validity
of this analysis depends upon the strength of the underlying
"rule of reason" approach that the provisions of section 7 were designed to abolish. A
similar "balancing" was advocated in In re United States Steel Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270
(1968), rev'd and remanded, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970). In that case, the hearing examiner found the acquisition exempted from section 7 because the acquired corporation was
in a failing condition. Id. at 1275. The Commission, while affirming the examiner's findings, ruled that section 7 proscribed the merger. Id. The Commission held that proof of a
company's failing condition does not automatically immunize a transaction. There are
still anticompetitive effects from the merger which must be balanced against potential
adverse effects on the failing company's stockholders, creditors, and employees and on the
community in which the company is located. Id. at 1280-88. This is a balancing of factors
very similar to that suggested in General Dynamics. The Supreme Court, however, is
likely to weigh the factors differently. See notes 157-64 infra and the accompanying text.
79. See Robinson, supra note 68, at 253. See generally Knapp, General Dynamics,
Mirage or Oasis?, 26 MERCER L. Rzv. 577 (1975); 53 N.C.L. REv. 535 (1975); 27 U. FLA. L.
REv. 281 (1974).
80. See Robinson, supra note 68, at 251 (for a discussion of Robinson's argument see
note 158 infra and accompanying text). But see notes 158-64 infra and accompanying text.
The dissent in GeneralDynamics attacked the majority's emphasis on the weakness
of the acquired company as a future competitor when the failing company defense had
admittedly not been satisfied. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,
522-23 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. Robinson, supra note 68, at 251 (arguing that under Justice Stewart's approach
the failing company doctrine "might well become a piece of excess baggage").
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premise: that such an acquisition cannot have significant anticompetitive effects.
Justice Stewart did not give any indication that Citizen
Publishinghad established a new requirement for the defense. In
fact, the Court's somewhat liberal approach to section 7 indicates
that it would not wish to narrow the defense any further than it
already has. Thus, although not a failing company case, General
Dynamics may have a significant impact on the future of the
doctrine.
The cases following Citizen Publishingindicate that the confusion of the courts in dealing with the failing company doctrine
results from the lack of a clearly articulated policy governing its
elements.82 There is a substantial split of opinion over whether it
should be a per se affirmative defense or merely one factor in the
overall determination of probable anticompetitive effect.8 3 Underlying this conceptual controversy is a split concerning the doctrine's economic rationale. It has been justified purely on the
theory that competition cannot be lessened to any appreciable
degree when a competitor acquires a company which will disappear from the market in any event, and alternatively on the basis
of benefit to the failing concern, its stockholders, creditors, and
other interested parties. 4 A critical examination of these justifications is necessary in order to determine the proper role of the
failing company doctrine in a section 7 suit.
If it is presumed that the acquisition of a firm about to leave
the market cannot generate anticompetitive effects, the actual
anticompetitive consequences of an acquisition will be disregarded and the doctrine will be given a per se application, stressing the strict requirements which arguably maintain the validity
and narrow scope of the presumption. As the presumption is recognized as increasingly rebuttable, the doctrine will focus to a
greater extent on the actual anticompetitive consequences-thus
bearing directly on the Government's prima facie case.
82. See Low, The Failing Company Doctrine:An Illusive Economic Defense Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 425, 430 (1967).
83. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HARV. L. REV. 227, 339-47 (1960); Dooley, supra note 12; Low, supra note 82. See also
Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The "Failing Company" Myth, 49 GEO. L.J. 84
(1960) (arguing that financial difficulties are relevant only to the substantive determination); von Kalinowski, Section 7 and CompetitiveEffects, 48 VA. L. REV. 827, 841 (1962)
(maintaining that failing conditions only "negate" the showing of anticompetitive consequences).
84. See notes 116-30 infra and accompanying text.
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Judicial concern for the interests tied to a failing company,
if so great as to be dispositive, will also make the doctrine a per
se defense. If the judicial concern is not dispositive, then the
competitive consequences of the acquisition should be considered
in determining what weight is given to that concern. The doctrine, however, would not bear directly on the Government's
prima facie case. The end product would be a balancing along the
5 Before
lines suggested by Justice Stewart in GeneralDynamics."
defining a failing company, however-in terms of "dim or nonexistent prospects for reorganization," "actual insolvency," "imminent bankruptcy," or another standard-a court must decide the
policy and purpose of the doctrine. The inquiry should begin with
a study of the doctrines origins.
INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. V. FTC AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FAILING
COMPANY DOCTRINE

In the leading case, International Shoe Co. v. FTC," the
stock of W. H. McElwain Company, a shoe manufacturer experiencing extreme financial difficulties, was acquired by International Shoe Company, a firm in excellent financial condition. 8
The Supreme Court held that the acquisition did not violate
section 7.88 The Court set forth two grounds for its decision.
First, since the companies were not competitors, the acquisition
could not substantially lessen competition within the meaning
of the statute then in effect. 9 Second, the Court decided that
85. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
86. 280 U.S. 291 (1930). InternationalShoe was the first Supreme Court case to rule
on the failing company doctrine. It remains the only Supreme Court case to apply the
doctrine in a defendant's favor. The merger involved was a result of the recession following
the First World War. Justices Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis dissented on the ground that
application of the failing company doctrine was mistaken, because they believed that the
company was on the road to recovery at the time of the acquisition, and because there
was no reason to believe that the company could not have been successfully rehabilitated
through a receivership. Id. at 306 (Stone, J., dissenting). See also note 96 infra and
accompanying text.
87. For a more detailed discussion of the facts of International Shoe, see Connor,
supra note 83, at 85-90; Comment, FederalAntitrust Law-Mergers-An Updating of the
Failing Company Doctrine in the Amended Section 7 Setting, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 566, 56971 (1963).
88. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
89. Id. at 299. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, before it was expanded by amendment
in 1950, forbid any acquisition of the stock of one competitor by another where the effect
might be to substantially lessen competition between the two corporations. Clayton Act
§ 7, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1974); see G. HENDERSON,
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 36
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section 7 is not applicable when the acquired company is in a
failing condition. In a widely quoted passage the Court stated:9"
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with
resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure
with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the communities where its plants were operated, we hold that the purchase
of its capital stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective purchaser), not with a purpose to lessen competition,
but to facilitate the accumulated business of the purchaser and
with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences
otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudicial to
the public and does not substantially lessen competition or restrain trade within the intent of the Clayton Act. To regard such
a transaction as a violation of law, as this Court suggested in
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp. . . . would "seem a distempered view of purchase and result."
InternationalShoe offers strong support for each of two broad
propositions. The first is that it may be presumed that the acquisition of a failing company by a competitor does not substantially
lessen competition or restrain trade within the intent of the Clayton Act. The second is that the defense is designed to afford the
shareholders, creditors, and personnel of a failing corporation an
opportunity to avoid the consequences of a grave situation. The
two requirements outlined in InternationalShoe- (1) resources
so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that the
company faced the grave probability of business failure and (2)
no other prospective purchaser-although imprecisely drawn,
remained the standard for the failing company defense for about
40 years until Citizen Publishingwas decided. 9
(1924). The Court held that, because of differences in appearances and workmanship, the
products of the two shoe manufacturers appealed to the tastes of entirely different classes
of consumers and that, while a portion of the product of each company went into the same
states, generally the product of each was in fact sold to different classes of dealers and

found its way into distinctly separate markets. Therefore, with respect to 95 percent of
the business there was no competition between the companies. Such competition as there
was or might have been was of too slight a consequence to support a finding of substantial
competition between the two companies. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291,
296, 298 (1930). But see id. at 303-06 (Stone, Holmes, Brandeis, J.J., dissenting) (taking
exception to the Court's analysis of what constitutes competition).
90. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930), quoting United States
v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 446-47 (1920).
91. In the 39 year interval between International Shoe and Citizen Publishing the
Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
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International Shoe is a case that can be all things to all
people. One section of the opinion emphasizes the need to protect
the interests of the personnel and shareholders of the corporation
and of the communities likely to be affected,92 while another sec294 (1962). In Brown Shoe Chief Justice Warren reviewed the legislative history of section
7 (id. at 311-23) and noted that "supporters of the [1950] amendments indicated that
[the amendments] would not impede, for example, a merger between. . . a corporation
which is financially healthy and a failing one which no longer can be a vital competitive
factor in the market." Id. at 319. After condemning the merger as tending to unduly
increase concentration in the industry, Chief Justice Warren alluded to the failing company doctrine:
At the same time appellant has presented no mitigating factors, such as the
business failure or the inadequate resources of one of the parties that may have
prevented it from maintaining its competitive position, nor a demonstrated need
for combination to enable small companies to enter into a more meaningful
competition with those dominating the relevant markets [sometimes referred
to as the "against giants" defense].
Id. at 346. Inadequate resources was a critical consideration in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). See notes 68-77 supra and notes 157-67 infra and
accompanying texts. The General Dynamics Court, however, made a definite distinction
between inadequate resources and business failure, a distinction which was crucial to
the decision of the case. See notes 75-77 supra and notes 157-64 infra and accompanying
texts. Brown Shoe, on the other hand, appeared to equate the two. The opinion in
Brown Shoe is unclear concerning whether a business failure should be viewed as "mitigating" the effect of the acquisition on competition (an approach similar to the one taken by
the Court in General Dynamics with respect to the inadequate resources of the acquired
company), or as "mitigating" an established violation under section 7 (an approach consistent with a per se application of the defense). What all this means for the future of the
defense is as yet unclear. See notes 161-76 infra and accompanying text.
In United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) the Court again mentioned
the failing company defense in passing: "This merger cannot be defended on the ground
that one of the companies was about to fail or that the two had to merge to save themselves
from destruction by some larger and more powerful competitor." Id. at 277. The case
involved a large retail grocery chain's acquisition of its direct competitor. After hearing
evidence, the district court concluded as a matter of law that there was no reasonable
probability that the merger would tend to substantially lessen competition or create a
monopoly in violation of section 7 since the resulting firm would occupy only 7.5 percent
of the market. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 233 F. Supp. 976 (C.D. Cal. 1964). The
Supreme Court reversed in a decision marked by a somewhat arbitrary statistical analysis
through which the Court concluded that there was a trend toward concentration in the
industry. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966) (Stewart &
Harlan, J.J., dissenting). Professor Low views the case as effectively destroying the
"against giants" defense, alluded to in Brown Shoe, and leaving the failing company
doctrine as "the only undisputed section 7 defense other than the 'investment exception'
specifically included in the act itself." Low, supra note 82, at 426. The purely statistical
approach taken by the Court in Von's Grocery appears to have been effectively rejected
in General Dynamics. See Robinson, supra note 68, at 244-45. If the Court has truly
changed its approach to section 7 suits then Low's predictions may have been prematurely
made. Under the rationale of General Dynamics weight should be given to nonstatistical
evidence supporting an "against giants" defense.
92. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 301 (1930). "The transaction took
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tion suggests that due regard must be given to the discretion of
the board of directors to choose between the alternatives of a
possible bankruptcy and an outright sale. 3 There are portions of
the opinion that concentrate on the necessity of a liquidation or
an outright sale94 and can be taken to support the argument that
Citizen Publishing's requirement that prospects for reorganization be "dim or nonexistent" was implicit in International
Shoe. It is unlikely, however, that the Court intended this.
In fact, there is a great deal of evidence that the issue was
before the Court and that such a standard was rejected as too
speculative."5 One of the principal grounds for the dissent focused
the form of a sale of stock instead of assets. .

. . because by that means the personnel
and organization of the McElwain factories could be retained, which . . . was regarded
as vitally important." The Court characterized the defense as avoiding "loss to stockholders and injury to the communities where its plants were operated .
Id. at 302.
93. Id. at 302. The Court noted:
As between these and all other alternatives, and the alternative of a sale
such as was made, the officers, stockholders and creditors, thoroughly familiar
with the factors of a critical situation and more able than the commission or the
court to foresee future contingencies, after much consideration, felt compelled
to choose the latter alternative. There is no reason to doubt that in so doing they
exercised a judgment which was both honest and well informed; and if aid be
needed to fortify their conclusion, it may be found in the familiar presumption
of rightness which attaches to human conduct in general.
Id,
94. Id. at 299.302. The Court noted that the officers of McElwain reasonably concluded "that the company was faced with financial ruin, and that the only alternatives
presented were liquidation through a receiver or an outright sale." Id. at 299. The Court
noted further that "the company had reached the point where it could no longer pay its
debts as they became due. . . . [Ilts annual financial statement . . . would disclose a
condition of insolvency . . . and thus bring the company to the point of involuntary
liquidation." Id. at 300, These portions of the opinion appear to support that aspect of
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969), which requires a finding
that prospects for reorganization be "dim or nonexistent."
95. The Federal Trade Commission argued that proof that the company could not
successfully pass through receivership was "essential" to an application of the defense:
Petitioner does not contend, and there is nothing in the record to show, that the
McElwain properties would have been more valuable if dismantled than if operated so that a receiver appointed to conserve the assets for the benefit of creditors and stockholders would have disbanded the organization and permanently
closed down plants. Such proof, however, is essential to a showing that the
financial difficulties would have terminated competition between the companies.
It is a matter of common knowledge that many large and successful industrial concerns, as well as numerous railroads, have at one time or another
passed through receiverships.
Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 23-24, International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S
291 (1930). The petitioner argued in turn against the application of this standard:
[Ilt is submitted that the true test was solely one of commercial and financial
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on precisely this point:96
Nor am I able to say that the McElwain Company ... was
then in such financial straits as to preclude the reasonable inference. . . that its business, conducted either through a receivership or a reorganized company, would probably continue to
compete . . . . [Citation omitted.] It plainly had large value
as a going concern, there was no evidence that it would have
been worth more or as much if dismantled ....
The dissent would apparently have limited the doctrine to companies that have little if any residual going concern value, that
is, those without reasonable prospects for reorganization. In contrast, the majority's approach did not focus on the likelihood of
a successful reorganization, but on the probability that such proceedings would be commenced. When the Court referred to "the
prospect of rehabilitation" as "remote," it was referring to rehabilitation prior to bankruptcy.
Cases Preceding InternationalShoe
The Supreme Court's decision in InternationalShoe has
been called the "seminal" case on,97 and the "genesis" of,9" the
failing company doctrine. Reliance solely on InternationalShoe
has done as much to blur as to clarify the policies underlying the

doctrine. Reference to the case law preceding International
Shoe-the doctrine appeared as early as 1910 59-reveals

that it

capacity to survive the embarrassments which confronted the corporation and
its management.
Id. at 45-46. The Court rejected the Commission's argument:
It was suggested by the court below, and also here in argument, that instead of
an outright sale, any one of several alternatives might have been adopted which
would have saved the property and preserved competition; but, as it seems to
us, all of these may be dismissed as lying wholly within the realm of speculation. . . . It might have availed itself of a receivership, but no one is wise
enough to predict with any degree of certainty whether such a course would have
meant ultimate recovery or final and complete collapse. If it had proceeded, or
been proceeded against, under the Bankruptcy Act, holders of the preferred
stock might have paid or assumed the debts and gone forward with the business;
or they might have considered it more prudent to accept whatever could be
salvaged from the wreck and abandon the enterprise as a bad risk.
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, supra at 301-02.
96. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 306 (1930) (Stone, Holmes, Brandeis, J.J., dissenting).
97. 16B Business Organizations, J. VoN KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 19.03(1)(b) (1971).
98. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 12, at 1438.
99. Northwestern Consol. Milling Co. v. William Callam & Son, 177 F. 786 (E.D.
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was not the genesis of the doctrine, but rather the leading case
which was a culmination of several earlier cases. A thorough analysis of the earlier cases, especially those specifically relied upon
in InternationalShoe, clarifies the policies expressed in that case.
In American Press Association v. United States,10 the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted a petition (for modification of a consent decree under the Sherman Act) to permit the
sale of a printing plant to the company's only competitor. This
was the first appellate opinion in which the failing company defense was recognized and the first to specifically rely upon it.",'
Mich. 1910). This case contained the first reference to the concept of a failing company.
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's flour milling company, a consolidation, had
been organized as a monopolistic combination in violation of the Sherman Act, Michigan
statutes, and the common law. Id. at 788. The facts indicate that the plaintiff attempted
to overcome the defendant's argument by showing that three of the companies
consolidated were in a failing condition when acquired. The court disposed of the question
as irrelevant. Id.; accord,United States v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F. 499, 503 (N.D. Ill. 1916)
(Mack, J., concurring), appeal dismissed on motion, 253 U.S. 499 (1920). The court in
Quaker Oats stated:
While on the facts presented it seems clear that the Quaker Oats did not go out
with any intent to destroy Great Western [the acquired company], to buy it
off, and while it seems clear that the Great Western was anxious to sell out
because of its actual insolvent condition, I do not think that that affects the
question, either under section 1, or under the monopolization clause of section
2.
Id. The issue was not central to the case because the decision actually turned on the
Government's inability to sustain its burden of proof that a monopoly had been established in the manufacture and sale of the products involved. Id. at 504.
United States v. International Harvester Co., 214 F. 987 (D. Minn. 1914), appeal
dismissed on motion, 248 U.S. 587 (1918), was the second case to consider the failing
company concept. In dicta, the court recognized the possibility of the defense:
Suppression of competition, where the parties to a combination control a
large portion of the interstate or foreign commerce in the article, and where there
is no obligation to form the combination arising out of the fact that the parties
to the same are losing money, or the like, has been held an undue restraint of
trade.
Id. at 998 (emphasis added).
The failing company concept was also considered prior to InternationalShoe in cases
decided under state law, see Lumbermen's Trust Co. v. Title Ins. & Inv. Co., 248 F. 212
(9th Cir. 1918). The court, sitting in diversity, denied a defense, based on antimonopoly
provisions of state law, on the grounds that the acquired companies all faced losses and
possible insolvency. See also City Ice Co. v. Easton Merchants' Ice Co., 267 Pa. 500, 50406, 110 A. 350, 351-52 (1920), where the failing company concept was used to reject a
defense of monopoly through merger in a suit for specific performance of a contract to
purchase.
100. 245 F. 91 (7th Cir. 1917).
101. American Press is historically significant for several additional reasons. It was
cited and relied upon in International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 303 (1930). Twentyfive years after the decision it was reaffirmed in Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 881
(7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944), one of the few cases to uphold and apply
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The American Company could not conduct its operations without
loss, had little going concern value, and was about to go out of
business. The court found that its sale would be advantageous to,
and would not injure, the public." 2 The Seventh Circuit reasoned:'03
[T]he American Company [the acquired company] is forced
to go out of the plate business. No decree can stop that. And
after the American Company quits, if the Western is left alone
in the field, the ultimate situation of the country newspapers
would be the same whether the plant be scrapped or sold as an
integer. Neither the decree nor, in our judgment, the Sherman
Law, prevents the Western from buying the scraps piecemeal.
If it did buy, it could organize them anew. If it be permitted to
buy the integer, it would save the expense of reorganization. If
the plant be scrapped, two injuries result: One to the public
from the destruction of a usable and useful plant; the other to
the stockholders of the American Company.
Thus, the court took a position closely analogous to the imposition of the "third requirement" announced in Citizen Publishing.
The American Company was headed toward inevitable dismemberment and liquidation. The court concluded that the ultimate
the doctrine as a per se affirmative defense. See note 118 infra. Four years after that, in
House subcommittee hearings considering amendments to sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton
Act, the case was mentioned with approval in a letter-memorandum written by W. T.
Kelly, then Chief Counsel to the Federal Trade Commission. Hearingson H.R. 515 Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1947).
Senator Kefauver, the sponsor of the bill eventually enacted, introduced the lettermemorandum in support of his position that the sponsored amendments would not apply
to companies in a failing or bankrupt condition. The memorandum refers to American
PressAssociation as "authority that an acquisition of a corporation, not yet insolvent, does
not violate the Sherman Act if business cannot continue without a loss." Id. at 11. In
conclusion it stated that
it follows that the latter type of purchase of stock or assets would be held not to
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act as now proposed to be amended ....

The

bill incorporates no amendment which would make the authorities above cited
inapplicable as precedents.
Id. at 11. H.R. 515 eventually became H.R. 3736, on which a House subcommittee report,
H.R. REP. No. 596, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), was written later in the year. These were
the forerunners of the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act.
102. American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 F. 91, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1917). The
Seventh Circuit granted the modification on the ground that the Association was losing
about $3,000 per month and there could be no violation of the antitrust laws when the
acquired firm was in such a failing condition. "[Antitrust law] does not require the
stockholders of a company ...

to sustain a loss ...

if that loss can be prevented ....

Id. at 94.
103. Id. at 93.
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competitive situation would be the same whether the company
was scrapped or sold to its competitor before liquidation and
considered this fact dispositive. The court's position-that there
are no anticompetitive effects from sale of the integer when liquidation is inevitable-underlies a "third requirement" approach.
"Dim or nonexistent" prospects for reorganization supplies a degree of certainty that the failing company would have been liquidated. While American Press also expressed some concern with
the ability of the owners of the failing company to avoid economic
injury, this concern was limited to the injury following an inevitable liquidation-injury which would to a substantial certainty
occur if a sale were not permitted. The likelihood of such injury
is directly dependent upon the likelihood of liquidation itself;
thus, the court's concern for the company's owners played a subsidiary role in the decision.
United States v. United States Steel Corp. 14 held that
certain acquisitions by the defendant did not create a monopoly
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. United States
Steel Corporation was a holding company formed by the acquisition of 180 operating companies. The district court dismissed
the suit on various grounds which were not related to the failing company doctrine. 1

5

In affirming, the Supreme Court did

not rely specifically on a failing company doctrine, but was "unable to see that the public interest [would] be served by yielding
to the contention of the Government respecting the dissolution of
the company .. ."106 In a general discussion the Supreme Court
recognized the existence of the defense for the first time."0 7 The
104. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).

105. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 F. 55 (D.N.J. 1915), aff'd, 251
U.S. 417 (1920).
106. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 457 (1920).
107. Id.at 446-47. The Court stated:
And he testified he was not deceived and that he believed that "the Tennessee
Coal and Iron people had a property which was almost worthless in their hands,
nearly worthless to them, nearly worthless to the communities in which it was
situated, and entirely worthless to any financial institution that had the securities the minute that any panic came, and that the only way to give value to it
was to put it in the hands of people whose possession of it would be a guarantee
that there was value to it." Such being the emergency it seems like an extreme
accusation to say that the Corporation which relieved it, and, perhaps, rescued
the company and the communities dependent upon it from disaster, was urged
by unworthy motives. Did illegality attach afterwards and how? And what was
the Corporation to do with the property? Let it decay in desuetude or develop
its capabilities and resources? In the development, of course, there would be
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Court's discussion indicates a concern not only for the seller of the
failing business, but also for the communities dependent upon
the business-its employees and the local commerce. This policy
is reflected in InternationalShoe which quoted from and relied
upon United States Steel Corp.11

The failing company doctrine, which has become associated
primarily with actions under section 7 of the Clayton Act, was not
directly referred to in a section 7 suit until Aluminum Co. of
America v. FTC09 was decided in 1922. In that case, the Third
Circuit did not consider the failing condition of the acquired company relevant to a section 7 suit. 110 The dissent, however, argued
in favor of permitting the merger based on the fact that the company would have failed but for the defendant's acquisition of it.",
In a later case the Third Circuit permitted the same merger on
the ground that the acquired company could not otherwise pay
its substantial accumulated debts." 2 The court held that section
7 did not prohibit the defendant, although a former violator of
section 7, from acquiring the property of the competing corporation by "proceeding in any manner provided by law for the collection [of a debt not shown to have been fraudulently contracted] ." ' 1 Since it was the defendant to whom the substantial
sums were owed, the acquisition was akin to foreclosure by a
creditor. The court asked: "Does the Clayton Act . . . nullify

other laws and deprive such a creditor of the right to resort to
them?""' It found nothing to indicate that the Act should have
that effect. Thus, in the first case in which a court dealt with the
failing company doctrine in a section 7 context, the rationale for
the decision was the protection of creditors' rights. This view is
not very different from the one expressed in American Press
profit to the Corporation, but there would be profit as well to the world ...
[Ilt would seem a distempered view of purchase and result to regard them as
violations of law.
Id. (emphasis added).
108. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 303 (1930). See also note 90 supra
and accompanying text.
109. 284 F. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923).
110. Id. at 408.
111. Id. at 410 (Buffington, J., dissenting).
112. Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 299 F. 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1924). This decision
was cited with approval in the letter-memorandum written by W. T. Kelly, Chief Counsel
to the Federal Trade Commission, and introduced at the House hearings on the amendment of section 7. Hearings on H.R. 515, supra note 101, at 10-11.
113. Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 299 F. 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1924).
114. Id.
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where the Seventh Circuit found a close relationship between the
equitable remedies available in a bankruptcy proceeding and in
a sale prior to bankruptcy."' While Aluminum Co. of America
presents the somewhat unique circumstance of an acquiring firm
which is also the major creditor of the failing company, logically
the absence of this particular circumstance should not affect the
creditors' rights. It certainly does not affect the creditors' expectations of receiving additional value from their investment by the
sale of the company as a going concern prior to bankruptcy.
In determining the true scope of the failing company doctrine, it is important to bear in mind that the defense was not
invented in InternationalShoe. The major policy in the earlier
cases appears to have been protection of creditors' interests in the
failing concern-a purchase being the only way to give value to
the creditors' investment. These cases can be said to view the sale
of such a company as an extension of equity's power to liquidate
a bankrupt concern, which is a power immune to the antitrust
laws. Most of the cases viewed acquisition of the failing concern
as only one step prior to a liquidation or scrap sale. In this respect
there is support in those cases for a requirement that prospects
for reorganization of the acquired company be "dim or
nonexistent." There would be no harm in allowing the interests
tied to a failing concern to realize whatever going concern value
was present in the integer, rather than dissipating this value in a
bankruptcy sale. This analysis is based on a belief that there
could be no public harm if the company were to leave the "field"
in any case. If this is also the basis of InternationalShoe then its
approach is internally consistent: the Court's concern with a failing company's creditors, stockholders, and the surrounding community is to allow those interests to profit by a prebankruptcy
sale without risk of injury to the public. In fact, the public is
benefited by the avoidance of a wasteful equitable proceeding.
The underlying premise, hinted at in InternationalShoe, is that
a concern which is forced out of the market can no longer have
an effect upon it, and hence, its acquisition by a competitor can
have no anticompetitive consequences. The requirement that
prospects for reorganization be "dim or nonexistent" serves the
purpose of determining to a substantial certainty that the company could never again surface as a going concern. Whether this
115. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
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inquiry is relevant depends upon the strength of the underlying
premise.
THE DOCTRINE'S ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION

The economic rationale of the failing company doctrine, as
first formulated, was that because the failing company would
shortly be unable to compete, its sale to a competitor could not
result in a substantial lessening of competition."' Thus the interests tied to the concern could reap whatever value remained
through a sale whose prohibition would have resulted in a wasteful withdrawal of the failing company's intact assets from the
market." 7 The uncritical acceptance of the doctrine so formulated
116. See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930); American Press
Ass'n v. United States, 245 F. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1917); von Kalinowski, Section 7 and
Competitive Effects, 48 VA. L. REv. 827, 841 (1962) ("It can hardly be said that the
acquisition of a company in financial distress could have any detrimental competitive
effect."); Comment, "Substantially to Lessen Competition...
Current Problems of
Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1662-63 (1959); cf. Connor, supra note 83, at 87,
90; Dooley, supra note 12, at 1439; Low, supra note 82, at 427-28; Markham, The New
Antitrust Policy and the Individual Business Firm, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 607 (1965).
A similar economic theory underlies some cases not involving the failing company
doctrine, but having some important parallels to it. See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v.
Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833
(1961), aff'g 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (en banc); United States v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc.,
170 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Tex. 1959). See also von Kalinowski, supra at 844-45.
Union Leader involved, in part, the acquisition of a local newspaper operating in a
natural monopoly market. The court stated, "If competition is doomed by market conditions, it cannot be 'lessened' by a change of ownership." Union Leader, supra at 589. Alcoa
involved an allegation of monopolization of the aluminum industry under section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit en banc, foresaw a
defense to a charge of monopolization under circumstances where "[a] market . .. [is]
. . . so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the cost of production
except by a plant large enough to supply the whole demand. Or . . . [where] . . .
changes in taste or in cost. . . drive out all but one purveyer." Alcoa, supra at 430. HarteHanks involved the acquisition by a chain of strong newspapers of its sole competitor in
a town of 17,000 after each paper had lost a considerable amount of money in a fight for
survival. The court stated, "[t]here must be space and room and subject matter involved
to afford a competition such as the law requires and where these things do not exist then
discontinuance of competition . . . is not a violation of the antitrust law." Harte-Hanks,
supra at 229.
Union Leader, Alcoa, and Harte-Hanks stand for the proposition that where it is
inevitable due to economic conditions and the market structure for one company to absorb
a failing competitor, or its share of the market, because the market can support only one
firm, there necessarily can be no adverse effect from such an absorption. The economic
theory is sound, in this context, because it involves an inquiry into the peculiar facts of
the case to determine an actual effect on competition, and is not a broad statement of
policy as in the cases dealing with the failing company doctrine.
117. See Comment, "Substantially to Lessen Competition.
Current Problems
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has resulted in its per se application in cases permitting acquisitions." 8 Even in cases where the defense was defeated, the courts
usually viewed their primary inquiry as whether the company
would continue as a competitor or be dismembered and liquidated, thereby disappearing totally from the market.119
of Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1663-64 (1959). See also notes 97-115 supra and
accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Granader v. Public Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 83 (6th Cir. 1969); Beegle v.
Thomson, 138 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944); United States
v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), af'd on
other grounds, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); cf. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78
(D. Colo. 1975) (once the elements are shown "then the 'failing company' defense has been
satisfactorily established," id. at 97); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902
(S.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 654 (1962) (granting summary judgment on the sole ground that the acquired concern "could not long have survived as an
independent competitor in its line of business," id. at 907).
In Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1943), the first case to enunciate the
failing company doctrine in a private section 7 action, the court found no violation on
three alternate grounds: (1) there had been no competition between the acquired and
acquiring company; (2) there was no allegation of injury to the plaintiff's business; and
(3) the acquired company was in a failing condition and "a firm closing out its business
because of financial difficulties may sell its plant even to a competitor without violating
the Anti-Trust Law." Id. at 880-81. Beegle thus treated the failing condition of the acquired company as an absolute defense; the decision is criticized for this reason, and
because "there was no reference to, nor application of, the elaborate criteria set out in
InternationalShoe." Connor, supra note 83, at 91.
In Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers the failing condition of two of three acquired
companies was claimed as a defense by an agricultural cooperative supplying 86 percent
of all milk purchased by suppliers in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Distinguishing the two failing companies from the other company, the court held their acquisition to be valid. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp.
799, 808-09 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd on othergrounds, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). The court held:
The acquisition of capital stock or assets of a failing corporation is not
within the ban of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. While the statute does not
expressly so provide, this conclusion is inherent in the statutory provision because the acquisition of a failing corporation that is on the verge of going out of
business cannot result in lessening competition or in creating a monopoly. Be
that as it may, the Supreme Court so held in International Shoe [citation
omitted].
The Court concludes, therefore, that the acquisition of the capital stock [of
the two failing companies] . . . was not violative of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.
Id. (emphasis added). Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers and Beegle present the most
persuasive authority that the failing company defense is a per se defense. See Connor,
supra note 83, at 92.
119. See, e.g., Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
In Crown Zellerbach the court pointed out that although the acquired company had
overextended itself in an expansion program and was experiencing difficulty in obtaining
financing, it nevertheless had substantial net worth. Crown Zellerbach, supra, at 831. In
Erie Sand & Gravel the court described the defense as applicable "to the acquisition of a
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Although this economic basis for the doctrine has been set
forth and repeated many times, practically every commentator
dealing with the subject has indicated that a merger or acquisition, even though involving a firm that would otherwise certainly
have disappeared from the market, can still have anticompetitive
effects. 20 One writer has formulated a list of six anticompetitive
effects which may flow from the acquisition of a failing company.'12 It appears that the economic rationale originally used to
justify the defense was simplistic and to some degree inconsistent
with antitrust policy. 2 2 Many authorities would now invalidate
competitor which is in such straits that the termination of the enterprise and the dispersal
of its assets seems inevitable unless a rival proprietor shall acquire and continue the
business." Erie Sand & Gravel, supra, at 280. The court found that "had [the defendanti
not bid, the prospect was not the elimination of a competing enterprise, but merely its
continuation under some new proprietorship." Id. The opinion indicates that if the acquired company was shown to be sufficiently likely to disappear totally from the market,
then its acquisition would have been valid regardless of the actual effect on competition.
Id.
See also Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972); Heatransfer
Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,309 (S.D. Tex. April 25, 1975),
appeal docketed, No. 75-27-79 (5th Cir. July 7, 1975); United States v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
120. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 83, at 340; Dooley, supra note 12, at 1439-40; Low,
supra note 82, at 428; Note, Horizontal Mergers and the "Failing Firm" Defense Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Caveat, 45 VA. L. REV. 421, 425-27 (1959).
121. Comment, FederalAntitrust Law-Mergers-An Updatingof the "FailingCompany" Doctrine in the Amended Section 7 Setting, 61 MICH. L. REV. 566, 577-78 (1963).
The following anticompetitive effects were listed: (1) enabling the acquiring firm to move
quickly into a new market; (2) increasing the acquiring firm's capacity to fill orders it
would otherwise be unable to meet, thereby preventing competitors from handling the
overflow; (3) removing facilities from the market, thereby forestalling a potential entrant
if the cost of building new facilities was prohibitive; (4) enabling the acquiring firm to
obtain more of the failing company's business than would have been possible had the firm
totally collapsed due to the acquisition of whatever good will is left in the failing company;
(5) totally integrating and thereby eliminating a customer or supplier of its competitors;
and (6) eliminating a component of the relevant market, thereby allowing the acquiring
firm to obtain an increased percentage of, and dominance in, the market without the need
for internal expansion. Id.
122. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), in which the defendants' monopoly practices consisted, in part, of contributing to the economic collapse of
its competitors-"many, if not virtually all, competitors were forced either to become
members of the combination or were driven out of business." Id. at 33. To allow the failing
condition of the defendants' competitors to be interposed as a defense in such a suit would
wholly defeat antitrust policy.
In other instances, mergers have been scrutinized even where the acquired company
has almost no market power. In this respect, it is antitrust policy to prevent even slight
accretions in market power. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963). The Supreme Court stated: "[11f concentration is already great, the importance
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any merger as a section 7 violation, regardless of the market share
or the size and strength of the acquired firm, if the resulting firm
would occupy a given percentage of the market. 23'
United States v. General Dynamics Corp.'24 indicates that
depleted reserves or financial reversals are nonstatistical market
evidence relevant to competitive effect. The severity of a company's financial difficulties, therefore, could be considered in
determining whether there is a substantive violation. Thus, the
probability that a company could not be reorganized in receivership, and the likelihood that it would disappear from the market,
might bear directly on the Government's case, but categorical
statements concerning competition in such cases cannot serve as
the basis for the failing company defense.
Because the rationale which had been given for the failing
company defense does not jibe with known economic facts and
theory, one writer has said that "[t]he conclusion seems inescapable that the failing company doctrine has no logical basis as it
is usually stated."' 25 Recognizing the inconsistencies, other writers have proposed alternate theories upon which to base the defense. For example, it has been justified "on the ground that it
of preventing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of
eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great." Id. at 365 n.42; accord, Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44 (1962); see, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). In Von's Grocery a
merger was condemned where it produced a firm with 1.4 percent of the grocery stores
and 7.5 percent of grocery sales in what the Court characterized as an increasingly concentrated market. The dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart vigorously attacked this result
as being statistically arbitrary. Von's Grocery, supra,at 290, (Stewart, J., dissenting). In
Continental Can an acquisition was held to substantially lessen competition where the
acquiring firm occupied 21.9 percent of the market and the acquired firm occupied only
2.1 percent of the market. In Alcoa an acquisition was also condemned where the acquired
firm had approximately 2 percent of the market, and the acquiring firm had 27.8 percent
of the market. In Continental Can and Alcoa the Court appeared to be concerned more
with the share that the resulting firm would have in a concentrated market, than with
the contribution of the acquired firm to the consolidation.
Similar concern has been shown in exclusive dealings cases where the result would
be the functional equivalent of a vertical merger. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Standard Fashion Co. v. MagraneHouston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922). See also Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract and
Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 53 (1959).
123. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 83, at 308-29. Professor Bok would invalidate any
merger by a dominant firm if its market share would be increased by more than two or
three percent of its premerger share.
124. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
125. Low, supra note 82, at 430.
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prevents potential bankruptcies . . . [which] is desirable because . . . [it] thus prevents adverse repercussions throughout
the economy."'' 6 Professor Bok has suggested the most appealing
justification for the doctrine, in light of economic realities: a concern for the interests of creditors, owners and employees interested in realizing the highest possible selling price and avoiding
a total collapse and disruption of the enterprise.'27 This view finds
some support in International Shoe,'25 in the cases preceding
International Shoe,1 29 and in the legislative history of the 1950
Celler-Kefauver Amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act. '
LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE
DEFENSE

As originally enacted in 1914, section 7 of the Clayton Act
forbade only certain acquisitions of a competitor's stock.',' The
statute was easily evaded by direct purchase of assets.'3 2 To plug
this "loophole"' 33 Congress amended section 7 in 1950 to prohibit
any stock or asset acquisition when "the effect of such acquisition
126. Note, Horizontal Mergers and the "FailingFirm" Defense Under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act: A Caveat, 45 VA. L. REv. 421, 425 (1959); see Dooley, supra note 12, at
1442. Professor Dooley maintains: "It can be contended that allowing the merger is preferable to forcing the failing company to sell its assets as scrap since it is likely that the
bidding competitor will expand internally anyway to meet postulated demand." But
Dooley himself admits that "the economic justifications for the doctrine are not overwhelming." Id. at 1443.
127. Bok, supra note 83, at 340. Bok suggests that "[p]rotecting these interests,
moreover, would coincide to some extent with the rather obvious legislative bias in favor
of small businessmen and tradespeople." Id. He cites two other possible considerations:
(1) efficiency, since a failing company might be improved by a change of management
(this he regards as unlikely due to the past treatment of "efficiency" arguments) and (2)
belief that the disappearance of a failing company from the competitive markets would
not lessen competition (this too he regards as unlikely since the assets of a failing company
in the hands of a strong acquirer could considerably improve its market position). Id. at
340; accord, Hale & Hale, supra note 12, at 598, which noted that:
It is easy to envisage customers, creditors and employees caught in a catastrophe. Judicial liquidation evokes a picture of drastic shrinkages in values.
Costs of administration appear high [footnote omitted] and probable diversion
of assets to other uses may involve shocking losses [footnote omitted].
Id. at 598.
128. See notes 86-97 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 98-115 supra and accompanying text.
130. See notes 131-49 infra and accompanying text.
131. Clayton Act § 7, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1974). See also note 89 supra.
132. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 313-14 (1962); see S. REP. No.
1775, supra note 11, at 2; Hearings on H.R. 515, supra note 101, at 4.
133. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 314 (1962).
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may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."' 34 During consideration of the Amendments beginning in 1947, many references were made to InternationalShoe
in Congress; the now famous passage from that decision'35 appears repeatedly in the legislative record.'36 The legislative history
does not reveal what, according to congressional opinion, constitutes a failing company, whether the defense is absolute, qualified, or part of the overall determination of competitive effect, or
precisely why the defense exists. 3 ' The record does show that
Congress anticipated some exception to -section 7 for the acquisition of a company suffering financial difficulties and expressed a
policy of protection for the various interests that would be adversely affected were the exception unavailable.
The chief concern of the amendment's opponents was that
immediate or long range financial problems may very likely
"militat[e] an immediate sale"' 138 of the physical properties of a

company at salvage or, at best, forced sale prices. 3 ' They argued
that the only available market for such sales is found among
competitors in the same field. 4 ' They urged that the failing company should be allowed "to offer itself as a going concern to the
highest bidder . . . [because, in a forced sale] good will and the

repute it may have earned as a going business would be lost to
134. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1974), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
See also note 2 supra.
135. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
136. See S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 11, at 7; H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note 11, at
6; H.R. REP. No. 596, supra note 101, at 5-6; Hearingson H.R. 2734 Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. at 80, 312 (1950)(remarks of
Representative Celler and Senator Kefauver); Hearings on H.R. 515, supra note 101, at
10-11 (remarks of Senator Kefauver and letter-memorandum by W. T. Kelly, Chief Counsel to the Federal Trade Commission); 96 CONG. REC. 16435 (1950)(remarks of Senator
O'Conor); 96 CONG. REC. 16440 (1950) (remarks of Senator Donnell); 96 CONG. REC. 16444
(1950)(remarks of Senator Kefauver).
137. There is, however, congressional support for the proposition that the "dim or
nonexistent" prospects of reorganization, mentioned in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1968), was never meant to be an element of the defense.
Numerous references support the view that it is sufficient if a corporation is merely
heading for bankruptcy, without regard to the outcome of such a proceeding. Nor does
the corporation have to be in a state of bankruptcy or receivership for the "failing company" defense to apply. See S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 11, at 7. Hearingson H.R. 515,
supra note 101, at 10 (remarks of Senator Kefauver); 96 CONG. REc. 16435 (1950) (remarks
of Senator O'Conor).
138. S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 11, at 22 (minority report).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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its stockholders." 4 ' The proponents of the amendment stated
that they were "in full accord with the proposition that any firm
in [a failing or bankrupt] condition should be free to dispose of
its stock or assets [and] that the proposed bill would not prevent
sales of [that] type."'' 2
Other sources indicate that the overriding legislative view
was not that such a sale or merger would have no anticompetitive
effect, but that stockholders have a right to sell a failing company
to avoid economic waste and harm to creditors and employees."'
There are also legislative materials which indicate that one basis
upon which a failing company defense should rest is that businessmen faced with a company in financial straits should be able
to react to the situation without being second-guessed in subsequent litigation regarding the effect of the acquisition on competition.' A problem closely associated with the failing company
doctrine and considered by Congress in 1950 was the one-man
firm whose "proprietor" either dies or retires leaving the business
in incapable hands. The consideration of this problem during the
hearings' is further evidence of congressional concern with the
141. Id.
142. Id. at 7 (majority report). The Report continued:
The judicial interpretation on this point goes back many years and is abundantly clear. According to decisions of the Supreme Court, the Clayton Act does
not apply in bankruptcy or receivership cases. Moreover, the Court has held,
with respect to this specific section, that a company does not have to be actually
in a state of bankruptcy to be exempt from its provisions; it is sufficient that it
is heading in that direction with the probability that bankruptcy will ensue.
Id.
143. See H.R. REP. No. 596, supra note 101, at 6; Hearings on H.R. 2734, supra note
136, at 79 (remarks of Senator Donnell and Representative Celler); 96 CONG. REc. 1644445 (1950) (remarks of Senators Thye, Kefauver, and O'Mahoney).
144. Hearings on H.R. 2734, supra note 136, at 79-80:
Sen. DONNELL: ... Suppose that your company would become in failing
circumstances and you wanted to sell your assets, sell the physical assets to
some other concern. Now, the question I want to ask you: First, how could you
be sure, without some prior litigation of some kind how could you be sure or the
purchasing company be sure, that they could safely acquire your assets of the
company...

?"

Rep. CELLER: The present Act and my Bill would have no application whatsoever to a corporation in a failing or bankrupt condition.
Such remarks, together with Congress' realization that the company "does not have to be
actually in a state of bankruptcy to be exempt from [the section 7] provisions" (S. REP.
No. 1775, supra note 11, at 7) are evidence that Congress envisioned the failing company
doctrine as allowing owners to act freely in an emergency situation, if one truly exists,
without fear of being second-guessed by a judge or jury.
145. Hearings on H.R. 2734, supra note 136, at 99-105. The problem was dismissed
as too small to come within the ban of the Clayton Act; see United States v. Von's Grocery
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interests tied to a company for which sale is a viable alternative
to business failure.
The legislative statements could be interpreted to mean that
Congress considered the defense to be "unconditional" and intended it as an exception to the antitrust laws.'46 At various
points, legislators did clearly state that the Clayton Act would be
inapplicable to a company in a failing condition.'47 It has been
argued, on the other hand, that Congress could not have intended
this result."' In light, however, of the great stress placed upon the
circumstances of a failing company, and the repeated references
to the right of owners of a failing concern to sell, it must be
admitted that Congress intended the failing condition of an acquired company to be more than a factor in determining the
impact on competition. Thus, once the economic justification for
the doctrine is discredited, if it is to remain a viable affirmative
defense, the best ground upon which to base it is the legislative
concern for the various interests tied to the failing company.'
GENERAL DYNAMICS, CITIZEN PUBLISHING AND THE FUTURE OF THE

DOCTRINE

The view that the failing condition of an acquired firm is a
per se affirmative defense-arguably expressed in International
Co., 384 U.S. 270, 298 nn.29 & 30 (1966) (Stewart, Harlan, J.J., dissenting).
146. See M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 472 (1973).
147. See Hearingson H.R. 2734, supra note 136, at 79-80 (remarks of Representative
Celler)("no application whatsoever"); 96 CONG. REC. 16435 (1950) (remarks of Senator
O'Conor) ("as already mentioned, the bill would not apply to a company in a failing or
bankrupt condition"); 96 CONG. REC. 16445 (1950), where, in the congressional debates, it
was stated:
Mr. THYE: Then, as I understand, there is nothing in the bill which would
prevent a corporation which might be classed as big business from . . . buying
out a little [business] which had been in operation for 50 years or more, but
which was forced to discontinue operations because of changes in conditions
Mr. O'MAHONEY: There would be nothing which would prevent that.
See also 96 CONG. REC. 11504 (1949) (remarks of Representative O'Conor).
148. See Connor, supra note 83, at 98, which states that:
Congressional accord with the proposition that a failing firm should be free
to dispose of its stock or assets must mean, in the absence of any specific
reference to such a situation in the statute itself, that the failing or bankrupt
condition of an acquired firm is to be one of the factors used in defining the
impact of an acquisition on competition. Thus the intent of Congress is not to
create an exception to the test of amended section 7, but merely to point out a
specific situation to which the test will be applied.
149. See Bok, supra note 83, at 340; Low, supra note 82, at 430.
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Shoe"'-has been weakened' 5 ' by the establishment in recent
years of the no other "available purchaser" requirement announced in Citizen Publishing."'The demise of a per se approach
is consistent with the discrediting of the traditional economic
justification for the defense. 1"' The only alternative rationale
which has support in the case law and the legislative history is a
concern for the owners, creditors, and employees of the failing
enterprise. The strength of that concern and the degree to which
the courts allow it to mitigate the policies of the antitrust laws
should determine how the defense is applied in the future. One
extreme, with some support in the legislative record' and in the
case law,'55 is to give paramount consideration to these mitigating
circumstances. It can be argued that the officers of the company
should be able to react to the situation without being secondguessed by an agency or a court with respect to the effect of the
acquisition or the likelihood of bankruptcy.'55 It is a fact of life
that management must often move quickly when faced with
imminent bankruptcy. Due regard should be given to the exigencies of the moment without asking for impossible evaluations by
the officers who must appraise the situation. Taken to its outer
limits this approach could require the courts to uphold the defense on the basis of a business judgment rule, deferring to the
discretion of the failing company's board of directors. That this
would wreak havoc on the policies of the antitrust laws cannot be
doubted. The other extreme is to give no controlling consideration
to the interests tied to the company. This would effectively destroy the doctrine as an affirmative defense and would result in
consideration of the acquisition from the perspective of the actual
anticompetitive effects, thereby merging the doctrine with the
substantive offense.
United States v. General Dynamics Corp."7 falls somewhere
between these extremes and should have the effect of reconciling
the defense with economic reality and the policies underlying it.
150. See notes 92-96 supra and accompanying text.
151. See Dooley, supra note 12.
152. See notes 28-34 supra and accompanying text.
153. See notes 116-30 supra and accompanying text.
154. See Hearingson H.R. 2734, supra note 136, at 79-80. See also note 144 supra and
accompanying text.

155. See notes 93 & 108 supra.
156. See notes 93 & 144 supra and accompanying text.
157. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). See also notes 68-81 supra and accompanying text.
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One commentator has argued that the case may have the effect
of merging the doctrine with the substantive offense, thus making
it "a piece of excess baggage."''58 General Dynamics, however,
does not stand for the broad proposition that a company with
depleted reserves, or one that is irretrievably failing, will never
have a substantial future competitive influence on the market. If

the case did, then the strict requirements of the failing company
doctrine would, indeed, be irrelevant. Justice Stewart clearly in-

dicated, however, that competitive effects can only be judged on
a case-by-case basis. 15 9 Under the Court's analysis, depleted re158. See Robinson, supra note 68, at 158. Robinson argues:
[The Court's] logic is fine as far as it goes. If the acquired company does not
have the wherewithal to be an effective competitive factor in the future, how
can it be said that its elimination by merger will substantially lessen competition? On the other hand, under [the Court's] approach the failing company
defense might well become a piece of excess baggage.
Id. See also notes 80 & 81 supra and accompanying text. This was one aspect of the dissent
in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 522 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
159. 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974). GeneralDynamics represents a significant return to
the approach taken in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22, & n.38
(1962), which put great stress on the particular circumstances involved in each section 7
case:
"Congress indicated plainly that a merger had to be functionally viewed, in the
context of its particular industry." [Citation omitted.]
"...
[OInly [an] examination of the particular market-its structure,
history and probable future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the
probable anticompetitive effect of the merger." [Citation omitted.]
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974), quoting Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 & n.38 (1962).
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974), the Court
reaffirmed its unwillingness to accept economic theory and mere possibilities of anticompetitive effect as dispositive of a section 7 case. Briefly, Marine Bancorporationinvolved
an acquisition by a Seattle bank, the second largest bank in Washington, of the state's
eighth largest bank, the third largest in Spokane (18.6 percent of the market). The acquisition was a market extension merger into the Spokane market, which was the only method
under Washington law-state regulations forbade de novo entry into other banking markets-by which the Seattle bank could operate a branch in any city or town outside its
principal place of business. In addition, once the acquisition was made, the Seattle bank
could not, under Washington law, expand by establishing additional branches in the
Spokane market. The thrust of the Government's case was that the merger eliminated the
possibility of the Seattle bank's entry into the Spokane market de novo through a sponsorship program (circumventing state law) or through a toehold acquisition, thereby eliminating any possibility of deconcentration in the future. In light of Washington's strict
regulatory scheme, Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, found that it was highly
unlikely that a de novo entry would have been feasible and that a toehold entry offered
"little realistic hope of ultimately producing deconcentration of the Spokane market." Id.
at 636. The majority warned against substituting mere speculation for actual proof of
anticompetitive effect. Justice Powell observed that "it blinks reality . . . to conclude
that the opportunity for entry through sponsorship, assuming its availability, is compara-
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serves and severe financial difficulties are relevant to the ultimate determination of competitive effect, but no categorical
statements should be made concerning their significance. The
present economic understanding16 supports this position.
In distinguishing a failing company situation from one where
the acquired firm is unable to compete due to structural changes
in the market,' the Court in GeneralDynamics seems finally to
have accepted the proposition that the acquisition of a company
on the brink of bankruptcy can carry with it serious anticompetitive effects."' By doing so, it has placed the defense on its only
supportable rationale: judicial concern for the interests tied to the
company. 6 3 Where an acquisition of a company on the brink of
bankruptcy has serious anticompetitive consequences, the ratio
decidendi of General Dynamics is inapplicable. It is to just such
a situation that the failing company doctrine should be addressed. Thus, the defense has not been undermined by General
Dynamics, rather its relevance has been more precisely drawn.
The defense has been kept distinct from the substantive offense,
but by suggesting a balancing approach to the doctrine, 4 the
Court has indicated a willingness, consistent with the second requirement of no other available purchaser, to depart completely
from a per se application of the defense. Its future application
ble to the entry alternatives open to unregulated industries," id. at 637, and that the
Government "failed to demonstrate that the alternate means [of entry] offer a reasonable
prospect of long-term structural improvement." Id. at 638-39. He concluded that "It]he
Government's argument . . . is little more than speculation. It provides no sound basis
for overturning the District Court's holding [of no violation]." Id. at 641.
More recently, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
422 U.S. 86 (1975). The case involved the de facto branching program of the defendant
bank, which circumvented state law forbidding de jure branching by Atlanta banks into
the Atlanta suburbs. The program consisted, in part, of a holding company forming de
facto branch banks in the suburbs. After Georgia State law was amended to allow de
jure branching on a countywide basis, the defendant absorbed the de facto branches and
made them true branches. The Government alleged a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act involving a conspiracy between the defendant and the de facto branches, and a
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act involving the absorption of the de facto branches
by the defendant. The Supreme Court held for the defendant in an opinion in which
Justice Stewart warned against "highly technical" (id. at 112) arguments for antitrust
liability that betray a "total lack of realism" about the circumstances surrounding a
challenged practice (id. at 119).
160. See notes 116-30 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 75-82 supra and accompanying text.
162. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,507 (1974). See also text
accompanying notes 77 & 78 supra.
163. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
164. Id.
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may very well consist of balancing the probability and degree of
serious injury to the interests tied to the failing company against
the likelihood and extent of anticompetitive effects resulting from
the acquisition.
What, then, is the relevance of "dim or nonexistent" prospects of reorganization?" 5 The inquiry can only be important in
assessing whether, if bankruptcy ensued, the company would to
a substantial certainty have been liquidated and, therefore, have
disappeared from the market. This determination, in turn, is
relevant only if the acquisition of a company which would have
definitely disappeared from the market can have no anticompetitive effect-an economic theory which has been discredited. The
requirement, when viewed in this light, constitutes a per se approach inconsistent with the second requirement of Citizen
Publishing itself, which moves the defense away from a per se
application. 6
A per se application of the doctrine has always been viewed
with enthusiasm by defendants, but an extension of the per se
approach through the "third requirement" would be unduly burdensome to the defendant and unfair to the interests concerned
with the life of the failing company. Bankruptcy causes trepidation in all those associated with the firm;"' creditors, owners,
employees, and customers can easily be caught in a catastrophe.
The mere prospect of judicial liquidation causes drastic shrinkage
in values. Costs of administration are high and diversion of assets
to other uses by way of liquidation sale can involve severe
losses.'6 ' If a merger or acquisition is not allowed, the prospects
for the enterprise are either a liquidation or, at best, a recapitalization resulting in new ownership, theoretically preserving the
interests of the creditors pari passu.6 ' In any case, the costs of
administration will deprive the owners and possibly the creditors
of value even if there is a successful reorganization. If there is
165. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
166. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
167. See Bok, supra note 83, at 244-45; Hale & Hale, supra note 12, at 598; Ryehm
& Billyou, A Comment on the ProposedNotice Legislation, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 195, 19798 (1956); cf. United States v. Columbia Pictures, 169 F. Supp. 888, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
168. See Laugharm, Costs of Bankruptcy Administration and the Effect of the Present Economic Trend Thereon, 32 REP. J. 50 (1958) (bankruptcy involves frictions which
may prove extremely costly).
169. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Missouri
Pac. R.R. Reorganization, 291 I.C.C. 477, 555 (1954), plan approved, 129 F. Supp. 392
(E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 225 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 959 (1956).
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judicial concern for these interests, a sale should be allowed in
order to realize the values that exist prior to a bankruptcy proceeding. The "third requirement" assumes an investigation by
the officers of the failing company, and by those of the purchasing
company (who may not be intimate with the facts) into the possibility of a successful recapitalization under the bankruptcy laws.
The result is to discourage-based solely on the speculative
outcome of a purely hypothetical bankruptcy proceedingacquisitions which would put value in the hands of the owners
and creditors of the failing concern.
Problems of administration are also an important consideration. The standard suggested by Citizen Publishingwould require
some kind of inquiry into solvency, liquidity, and going concern
value, involving factors such as capitalization rates and projected
cash flow.'70 In effect, an antitrust court faced with an asserted
failing company defense would have to examine not only the multitude of relevant economic factors that go into a section 7 determination, 71 but would have to make, in addition, the same kind
of inquiry a bankruptcy court is required to make.' 2 In a case
before the Federal Trade Commission, such as United States
Steel Corp. v. FTC,' this arguably is a feasible inquiry due to
the Commission's presumed expertise. It does not necessarily follow that a court administering the Clayton Act, with or without
a jury, would be capable of making the same inquiry. Consistent
administration of the antitrust laws is an important objective and
the result should not be made to depend upon the forum. The
average antitrust trial is already a complex affair.'74 An inquiry
170. See authorities cited at note 172 infra.
171. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
172. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Corp. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case
v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); In re Inland Gas Corp., 241 F.2d
374 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 838, rehearingdenied, 355 U.S. 879 (1957), construed
in 262 F.2d 510 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 979 (1959); Horowitz v. Kaplan, 193 F.2d
64 (1st Cir. 1951), cert denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952); In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C.
416, recommendation rejected and plan approved, 39 F. Supp. 846 (D. La. 1949). See
generally 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
11.01-.21 (14th ed. 1975); 11 REMINGTON ON
BANKRUPTCY §§ 4568-4606 (1961), and (Supp. 1975); Blum, The Law and Language of
Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 565 (1950); Blum, Full Priority and Full
Compensationin CorporateReorganization:A Reappraisal,25 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1958);
Brudney, The Investment-Value Doctrine and CorporateReadjustments, 72 HARV. L. REv.
645 (1959).
173. 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970). See also notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
174. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON PROCEDURE IN ANTI-

13 F.R.D. 62 (1951); McAllister, The Big Case:
ProceduralProblems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1950).
TRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES,
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into the outcome of a hypothetical bankruptcy would tend to
make a case of this kind so complicated that any judge might well
wonder whether the controversy is in fact justiciable.17 5 It is

doubtful that Congress intended that a court-or a business concern which is contemplating either acquiring or selling to another
company-make the investigations and analysis which the "third
requirement" demands in order to determine if the plans may be
carried out.' 6
A strong argument can be made that, under the analysis in
General Dynamics, prospects of reorganization should be examined in assessing an acquisition's effect on competition. This inquiry is one factor in determining the likelihood and extent, if
any, of competitive injury. The inquiry might also be useful in
determining the probability and degree of injury to the interests
tied to the company-against which the likelihood and extent of
competitive injury will be balanced. Viewed in this light, however, the "third requirement" should not be made a necessary
element of the defense. Its relevance varies on a sliding scale,
depending upon the circumstances of each particular case. In
light of the problems of judicial administration and the difficulty
175. See, e.g., Heatransfer Corp v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,309
(S.D. Tex. April 25, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-27-79 (5th Cir. July 7, 1975).
This sort of difficulty was foreseen in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 310 (1949), where the Court was critical of a "standard of proof, if not virtually
impossible to meet, at least most ill-suited for ascertainment by courts." In a footnote,
the court added:
The dual system of enforcement provided for by the Clayton Act must have
contemplated standards of proof capable of administration by the courts as well
as by the Federal Trade Commission and other designated agencies. . . .Our
interpretation of the Act, therefore, should recognize that an appraisal of economic data which might be practicable if only the latter were faced with the
task may be quite otherwise for judges unequipped for it either by experience
or by the availability of skilled assistance.
Id. at 310 n.13; see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963), in
which the Court noted:
[Unless businessmen can assess the legal consequences of a merger with some
confidence, sound business planning is retarded. . . .So also, we must be alert
to the danger of subverting congressional intent by permitting a too-broad economic investigation. . . .And so in any case in which it is possible, without
doing violence to the congressional objective embodied in § 7, to simplify the
test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in the interest of sound and practical
judicial administration.
See also Bromley, Business' View of the Du Pont-GeneralMotors Decision, 46 GEo. L.J.
646, 653-54 (1958) (indicating the difficulty in unscrambling a completed merger and the
need for businessmen to be able to make at least some predictions of the legality of their
actions when formulating future market plans).
176. See discussion note 175 supra.
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of the determination which the imposition of this inquiry would
demand of the businessmen involved, notwithstanding its
relevance, the prospects of reorganization should not, in most
cases, be litigated.
CONCLUSION

The basic stumbling block in defining the failing company
doctrine is the failure of the courts to confront the traditional
economic explanation and to develop a viable alternative rationale. The statement in InternationalShoe' 7 -that the purchase of
a failing company could not reasonably be held to lessen competition-has been thoroughly discredited.17 8 The lower court cases
have dealt with the defense in various ways and at times inconsistently.1 79 In the few cases in which the Supreme Court has
considered the doctrine since InternationalShoe it has made no
attempt to coordinate the elements of the defense with any underlying purpose.1

80

GeneralDynamics is the first attempt to sup-

ply a viable rationale. In addition, the problem of how to define
the doctrine has been complicated by the controversy over
whether it should be given a per se application or considered only
as it bears on the substantive offense.
The policy behind the failing company doctrine should be to
allow the stockholders, creditors, employees, and community of
a firm on the brink of bankruptcy to avoid the waste and expense
of a bankruptcy proceeding by selling the firm as a going concern
prior to actual bankruptcy or insolvency and its dissipating consequences. 8' The defense exists notwithstanding the economic
fact that such acquisitions may carry with them consequences
that would otherwise invalidate the acquisition. Since the defense
cannot be grounded upon the economic consequences of a merger
with a failing company, but is applied in spite of those consequences, it should not be required that the prospects for reorganization of the failing company be "dim or nonexistent"'8 2 for the
defense to be established.
177. International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
178. See notes 116-30 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 16-27 supra and accompanying text.
180. See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971); Citizen
Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1969); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 319, 346 (1962); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655
(1962). But see United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974).
181. See notes 116-49 supra and accompanying text.
182. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969).
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The Supreme Court's opinion in GeneralDynamics indicates
that the failing company doctrine is neither a per se affirmative
defense, nor limited to its bearing on the Government's prima
facie case. It is a true affirmative defense with some qualifications. Its underlying policy is to allow the interests tied to the
failing concern to recoup part of their investment before it is
dissipated further in receivership. This may result in some injury
to the competitve process. In some cases this injury to the public
will outweigh the injury to the private interests benefited by the
doctrine. Thus, future application of the doctrine should consist
of balancing the financial difficulties of the concern-the likelihood of bankruptcy, and the likelihood of losing substantial value
during or due to a bankruptcy-against the likelihood and extent
of injury to competition if the acquisition is allowed.
Roger B. Kaplan

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss3/3

42

